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IN THE SUPREIVIE COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ES.TATE
OF )!IGNON DENHALTER LEWIS·,

Case No. 7724

DECEASED,

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

vVe have considerable difficulty in ascertaining the
particular provisions of our law that is relied up·on by
the respondent as the basis of his claim that he is entitled
to participate in the distribution of the estate of Mignon
Lewis Deceased, even if it be assumed that he is the
natural grandchild of Henry Charles Denhalter.

On page 13 of respondent's brief there is cited the
· provision of Sections 14-2-14 and 14-4-12 of the Utah
Code Annotated, 1943 and on page 14 of such brief is
cited U.C.A., 1943, 101-4-10. Ap.parently respondent
claims that the intention of the Legislature is to be
gleaned from all of such provisions. Obviously the intentions of the Legislature in the enactment of U.C. A.,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1943, 14-4-12 and U.C.A., 1943, 101-4-10 could not have
been influenced by the passage of U.C.A., 1943, 14-2-14
because the latter act was not passed until 1911, 'vhile
the former acts were passed many years before. A

history of an act which is substantially the sa1ne as
U.c·.A., 1943, 14-4-12 will be- found in the case of Chapman v. Handley, 7 Ut. 49 and the companion case of In re
Estate of Thomas Cope, 7 Ut. 63, 24 Pac. 567, which
latter case was reversed in the case of Cope v. Cope, 137
u.s. 682.
In the case of In re Garr's Estate, 31 Ut. 57, 86 Pac.
757 it will be noted that Sections 10 and 2833 Revised
Statutes of Utah 1898 are the same as U.C.A., 1943, 14-412 and U.C.A., 1943, 101-4-10 respectively.
Before the respondent can recover he must bring
himself within one of the provisions of the law relating
to the right of illegitimate children to inherit property.
An illegitimate child cannot derive a part of such right
from one of such provisions and the remainder from
some other provision of our statute.
In our original brief, we have pointed out that the
language of our statute on bastardy is not susceptible of
a construction that the marriage of the parents of an
illegitimate child without more will render such child
legitimate. We shall not repeat what is there said.
There is however another reason which we neglected
to discuss in our original brief why the provisions of
our so-called bastardy law (U.C.A. 1943, 14-2-14) does
not aid the respondent in sustaining his claim to a part
of the estate of Mrs. Lewis. As stated in our original
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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brief, the original bastardy la'v "'a8 enacted in 1911,
La'Y~ of Utah, 1911, Chapter G2. At the time of the
enactn1ent of that la,v-, the father of the respondent had
been born. Trs. 43-46. He had been adopted by the Johnstons. Tr. 61. His mother and Henry Charles Denhalter
had been divorced. The divorce \Vas granted on July
29, 1910. Tr. 65-67.
l--:-tah now has and at all times involved in this proceeding has had a lavv which provides that "No part of
these revised statutes is retroactive unless expressly
so provided." U.C.A., 1943, 88-2-3. Such was also the
provisions of Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907, Sec. 2490.
Independent of statute such is the law generally as is
held by this and the courts generally. Farrel v. Pingree,
5 Ut. 443, 16 Pac. 843; Mercur Gold Mining & Milling
Co. v. Spry, 16 Ut. 222, 229; 52 Pac. 382. S.ee also 59
C.J.S. 1157 et seq.; Craw fords' Statutory Construction,
page 562, Sec. 277 et seq; Lewis' Sutherland Statutory
Construction, Vol 2, page 1157, Sec. 641 et seq. If the
court wishes to pursue the inquiry further, numerous
cases will be found collected in foot notes to the text
above mentioned.
The authorities teach that a retroactive law is a law
that looks backward or to things that are past. It grants
a right where none before existed or attempts to deprive
one of a right which formerly existed. The law making
power is prohibited from enacting some retroactive laws
such as ex part facto and laws impairing the obligations
of contracts by constitutional provisions. We do not
contend that there is any constitutional inhibition preSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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venting the Legislature from rendering children legitin1ate that were illegitimate before such law \Vas enacted,
but we do contend that there is no language in the bastardy law of 1911 or the amendments thereto which shows
or tends to show a legislative intention to give such
law a retroactive effect so as to confer a right of inheritance upon the respondent's father or upon him.
On pages 14 and 16 of respondent's brief, the case of
Bohwer v. District Court of First Judicial District, 41
Ut. 279; 125 Pac. 671 is discussed at some length and a
substantial part thereof is quoted. As we read that case
it ma.kes against the claim of respondent. We have discussed that case on pages 42 and 43 of our original brief
and no useful purpose will be served by repeating what
is there said.
Suffice it to again note that notwithstanding the
p-rovisions of U.C.A., 101-4-10 was at the time involved
in the case of Bohwer v. District Court supra, a part of
the law of this state this court expressly held that a child
meeting the requirements of that section is not thereby
rendered legitimate. Indeed the very language of U.C.A.,
1943, 101-4-10 refers to a child that is by such section
made an heir of the person who acknowledges himself to
be the father, as an illegitimate child. So also as pointed
out in our original brief that the only right conferred upon an illegitimate child by that section is the right to
inherit the estate of his parents. As the authorities
teach, that section is one of succession, not of legitimation. It is found in our law of succession. If the Legislature had intended by that section to render an illegitiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mate child legitilnate, it 'Yould have so provided as it did
in Sections U.C.A., 1943 14-4-12 and 1±-2-14.
On page 18 of respondent's brief, there is cited the
case of Wolf v. Gull, where it is held that legitimate children can inherit from their grandmother by right of
representation. \Ve have no quarrel with the law there
announced. Indeed "'"e cannot well see how the law could
be otherwise. If a child is rendered legitimate for all
purposes, such a status would doubtless include the
right of inheritance the same as in the case of a legitimate child. If the respondent fell within the provisions
of either U.C.A., 1943 14-2-14 or U.C.A. 1943, 14-4-12, we
would not be here contending that he could not participate in the estate of Mrs. Lewis if in fact he is the grandchild of her brother.
In both our original and in this· brief, we have
pointed out why the respondent may not successfully
establish a right by reason of U.C.A., 1943, 14-2-14, the
so-called bastardy law.
On pages 31 and 32 of our original brief, we have
enumerated the requirements necessary to render an
illegitimate child legitimate under the provisions of
U.C.A., 1943, 14-4-12. We are not entirely clear whether
the respondent claims that his father was rendered
legitimate by having complied with that statute. On page
27 of respondent's brief, it is said that "the language of
14-4-12, which states that the child made legitimate by the
father's acknowledgement is thereupon deemed for all
purposes legitimate from the time of its birth." Neithe-r
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that or any other statute of Utah makes a child legitimate
merely by acknowledgement.
If any lingering hope is entertained by respondent
that his father was rendered legitimate by U.C.A., 1943,
14-4-12, we direct the attention of the court to the facts
that all of the provisions of that section must be met to
render a child legitimate. If the court desires additional
authorities in support of the view that the evidence does
not bring the respondent's father within_ that provision
of our statute, we direct the attention of the c·ourt to
the following additional authorities: 7 C.J.S., page 948,
Sec. 20 and 10 C.J.S. p. 55 to 59 and cases cited in foot
notes to the text.
On page 21 of respondent's brief there is cited the
case of Smith v. Smith, 105 Kan. 294; 182 Pac. 538, 540,
and as we understand respondent's contention, the provisions of the laws of Kansas cited in the opinion are so
near like the pro~isions of our U.C.A., 1943, 101-4-10 that
the construction placed by the Kansas court on its statutes mentioned in that opinion should be placed upon
our S·ection 101-4-10.
There are a number of reasons why the decisions of
the Courts of Kansas are not applicable to our statutory law. Kansas apparently has no such provisions
as our section 14-2-14 and 14-4-12 whereby an illegitimate
child may become legitimate. It will be seen from the
opinion in the Smith case that there were a number of
other statutes in Kansas that the Court ap·parently held
gave support to the result reached in that case. Moreover,
in examining the Smith case and other Kansas cases from
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that state relating to illegitin1ate children, it is enlightening to read the case of Pfeifer v. Wright, 41 F (2d) 464
cited on page :2± of respondent's brief.
.A. reading of the case of Pfeifer v. Wright shows
that the judges of the Federal Circuit of Appeals had a
struggle to ascertain just 'vhat the law touching illegitimate children 'Yas in the State of Kansas. All of the
judges "~ere apparently agreed that language such as
that contained in the Kansas law does not rendeT an
illegitimate child legitimate at common law so as to entitle such child to inherit from persons other than those
specifically provided for in the law. One of the judges
took the view that Kansas had apparently adopted the
civil law and therefore an illegitimate child could inherit
the same as if legitimate.
vVhen the court reads the Pfeifer v. Wright case it
will, we believe, find that the law there announced is in
accord with the position of appellants, namely, that statutes such as our U.C.A., 1943, 101-4-10 is a statute of
succession and as such an illegitimate child is limited to
inherit in the estate of his father and is wholly without
right in the estate of collateral relatives of his father.
Respectfully submitted,
ELIAS HANSEN,
Attorney for Appellants
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